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PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Amendment 6 to United States Constitution: In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Amendment 8 to United States Constitution: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
Amendment 14. Section 1. to United States 
Constitution: All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
Section 76-3-206, U.C.A.: Death or life 
imprisonment. 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital 
felony shall be sentenced in accordance with section 
76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life 
imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with 
this section, shall determine. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of 
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Utah 
State Supreme Court within 60 days after certification 
by the sentencing court of the entire record unless 
time is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 
days by the Utah State Supreme Court for good cause 
shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme Court 
shall have priority over all other cases and shall be 
heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Utah 
State Supreme Court. 
Section 76-3-207, U.C.A.; Capital felony-
Sentencing proceeding. 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been 
found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be 
further proceedings before the court or jury on the 
issue of sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to 
a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be 
conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by a 
jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant 
has been found guilty of a capital felony, the 
proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury 
which found the defendant guilty, provided the 
defendant may waive hearing before the jury, in which 
event the hearing shall be before the court. If, 
however, circumstances make it impossible or 
impractical to reconvene the same jury for the 
sentencing proceedings the court may dismiss that jury 
and convene a new jury for such proceedings. If a 
retrial of the sentencing proceedings is necessary as a 
consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the 
sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in 
subsection (4) below. 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may 
be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant 
to sentence, including but not limited to the nature 
and circumstances of the crime, the defendants 
character, background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court 
deems to have probative force may be received 
regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary 
rules of evidence. The state fs attorney and the 
defendant shall be permitted to present argument for or 
against sentence of death. Aggravating circumstances 
shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Mitigating circumstances shall include the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or 
under the substantial domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) 
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirement of law was substantially impaired as a 
result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence of 
drugs; 
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of the 
crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder 
committed by another person and his participation was 
relatively minor; 
(g) Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
(3) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall 
retire to consider the penalty. In all proceedings 
before a jury, under this section, it shall be 
instructed as to the punishment to be imposed upon a 
unanimous verdict for death and that to be imposed if a 
unanimous verdict for death is not found. If the jury 
reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of 
death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall 
impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of 
death, the court shall discharge the jury and impose 
the sentence of life imprisonment. 
(4) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the 
sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds 
prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, 
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case 
to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings to 
the extent necessary to correct the error or errors. 
No error in the sentencing proceeding shall result in 
the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In 
cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all 
exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other 
evidence properly admitted inn the prior trial and 
sentencing proceedings shall be admissible in the new 
sentencing proceedings, and: 
(a) If the sentencing proceeding was before a jury 
a new jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing 
proceeding; .... 
Section 76-5-202, U.C.A.: Murder in the first 
degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
• • • 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved 
manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical 
torture*, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily 
injury of the victim before death. 
(2) Murder in the first degree is a capital 
offense. 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
: Criminal No. 9707 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Supreme Court No. 860063 
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: Argument Priority 
DOUGLAS CARTER, : Classification No. 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The American Civil Liberties Union is an association 
dedicated to the preservation of constitutional rights and 
liberties. We believe that the rights of all citizens are 
threatened when the rights of any citizen are denied. We believe 
that there is no greater challenge to the liberty and security of 
free citizens than occurs when a death penalty is imposed in 
violation of State law and the Constitution of the United States. 
We urge the Court that this is such a case. 
STATEMENT 
Amicus concurs in the statement of the case contained in 
page 1-2 of the Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Amicus will not address several points raised in the briefs 
of Defendant-Appellant. Our failure to address those points is 
in no way intended to disparage such contentions or indicate our 
views on their merits. We believe that our role as Amicus is 
best fulfilled by addressing additional issues rather than 
reiterating points covered by Appellantfs briefs. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court violate defendant's rights under 
Utah law and the Constitution of the United States by failing to 
instruct the jury in accordance with the Utah Statute qualifying 
and limiting the meaning of "especially heinous, atrocious, 
cruel, or exceptionally depraved." 
2. Does the instructional error require reversal and 
remand of the case for a new penalty hearing. 
3. Was the argument of the prosecutor on the meaning of 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, etc. erroneous and did it 
aggravate the error resulting from the courtfs erroneous 
instructions. 
4. What construction should be given to 76-5-202(1)(q) so 
as to be consistent with constitutional standards and the fair 
import of the statutory language. 
5. Was defendant denied the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
6. Should this Court mandate additional instructions to 
the jury so as to minimize the risk of a misguided verdict of 
death. 
7. Is there sufficient basis in the record for the court 
to make a determination on appeal of the proportionality and 
appropriateness of the death penalty and, if so, is the death 
penalty disproportionate in this case. 
2 
FACTS 
On February 27# 1985, Mrs. Eva Oleson was killed in her 
home, apparently by an intruder. Her hands had been tied behind 
her back, (R.1119) and she was stabbed ten times with a knife and 
shot once in the back of the head. (R.1278) The killing of Mrs. 
Oleson received news media attention in Utah County. (R.375-378) 
Some of the publicity focused on the fact that Mrs. Oleson was 
the wife of the Provo Police Chief's uncle. (R.367,376) 
Subsequently, Appellant Douglas Carter was charged with the 
crime. In December, 1985 he was tried and convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to death. 
The jury found the defendant guilty on two alternative 
aggravating circumstances: that the killing occurred while the 
defendant was engaged in the commission or attempt to commit 
aggravated burglary; and that the killing was especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved. (R.185-186) 
In instructing the jury on the elements of murder in the 
first degree, the trial judge failed to inform the jury of the 
meaning of the term "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel or 
exceptionally depraved". (R.138) Though U.C.A. 76-5-202, 
defining first degree murder, specifically qualifies the term 
especially heinous, atrocious, etc., in subsection (1)(q), by 
adding "any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim 
3 
before death", the jury was never informed of that qualifying 
language or of the limited meaning of the statutory term. The 
qualifying language was also omitted from a jury verdict form 
that the jury was given to take with them into the jury room for 
deliberations. (R.185-186) 
Defense counsel did not object or take exception to the 
court's instructions on the guilt phase of the trial. 
During the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the 
jury they could consider the aggravating circumstances found by 
them in the guilt phase, any of the statutory mitigating 
circumstances, and any other aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances in determining the appropriate penalty. (R.181-182) 
Again, they were not informed of the statutory qualification of 
the term "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally 
depraved". 
Defense counsel did not object or take exception to the 
court's instructions in the penalty phase. 
During closing argument in both the guilt phase and the 
penalty phase, the prosecutor repeatedly asserted that the 
killing was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel on grounds 
essentially broader than and sometimes inconsistent with the 
statutory limiting language. (R.1345, 1350-51, 1437, 1439) 
The defense counsel did not object to prosecutor's arguments and 
never himself argued, or indeed, raised the limited meaning of 
the especially heinous atrocious, cruel, standard under the Utah 
statute. 
4 
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following the day of his arrest. (R.289) Questioning by 
Nashville police continued for some four to five hours following 
the arrival of the Provo officers. (R.287) Lt. Pierpont then 
talked to defendant for half an hourf (R.293) following which Lt. 
Pierpont dictated the confession into a dictaphone machine. 
(R.305-6) The dictated statement was typed by a Nashville police 
stenographer and was then given to defendant who read it and 
signed it. (R.306-7) 
Lt. Pierpont testified at a hearing to suppress the 
confession that the wording of the confession was his; (R.306-7) 
that he dictated the statement based on what defendant had told 
him. Lt. Pierpont explained that he dictated a portion then 
asked defendant if that was correct then dictated another portion 
and asked if that was correct. (R.307) Lt. Pierpont said that 
defendant at no time disagreed with or challenged the dictation 
and made no changes. The statement was signed without change. 
(R.306) 
Defendant was thirty years old at the time of trial. He is 
a Black man with an I.Q. of 75 (R. 1437) who dropped out of high 
school in the eleventh grade. (R.1417) At the suppression 
hearing, he testified that he made the confession because of fear 
that the woman at whose house he was arrested would be prosecuted 
and would lose her children unless he cooperated and promises 
that she would be released if he cooperated. (R.316, 318-320) 
The police officers from Nashville and Provo who questioned 
defendant denied that they made any threats or promises to induce 
6 
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offered no public opinion survey evidence and no witnesses who 
testified that in their opinion there was extensive prejudice 
against defendant. The motion for change of venue was denied. 
(R.90-1) Defense counsel also moved to suppress the confession 
and gave notice of an intention to raise the defense of insanity 
but subsequently withdrew that defense, after reports from two 
court appointed "alienists" were obtained. (R 64,416) 
In response to defense counsel's claim of "honest surprise" 
about certain evidence being offered by the prosecution, the 
prosecutor stated for the record that defense attorney made no 
motion to obtain discovery from the prosecution of any relevant 
matters. (R.1301-2) The defense attorney did not even take 
advantage of the prosecutor's offer, made several times, that the 
defense attorney could examine the prosecutor's file in the case. 
(R.1303) At the trial, defense attorney called no witnesses in 
the guilt phase of the trial. (R.1339) No witnesses were called 
by defense in the penalty phase either, (R.1411,1429) but the 
defense did offer the reports of the two "alienists" who had 
examined the defendant before trial in connection with the 
subsequently withdrawn insanity defense. (R.1409) These reports 
were read to the jury. (R.1411-1429) Just before sentencing 
defense counsel argued, on a motion in arrest of judgment, "that 
it was his understanding" that the standard on the penalty phase 
"should have been whether the reasonable mind or reasonable minds 
could extract more aggravating circumstances than mitigating 
circumstances." (R.424) 
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The defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
because counsel failed to exercise the diligence of a reasonably 
competent professional in failing to familiarize himself with 
Utah law, in failing to resort to available discovery, and in 
failing to raise the limited meaning of an especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel homicide under Utah law. Because of 
counsel's failure, the question of whether the death penalty was 
appropriate in this case was never properly presented to the jury 
and cannot properly be evaluated by this Court on appeal. 
This court should take the occasion to clarify the 
instructions to be given the jury by mandating instructions which 
make clear that the law regards life imprisonment as no less an 
appropriate penalty than is death in a capital case. 
Though, because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the record is inadequate for full appraisal on appeal of the 
proportional appropriateness of the death penalty in this case, 
it seems that the death penalty is disproportionately severe when 
this case is compared with other first degree murder cases. 
I 
IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT IN A CAPITAL CASE, THE 
COURT WILL REVIEW MANIFEST ERRORS EVEN THOUGH NO 
OBJECTION WAS RAISED BELOW AND EVEN IF NOT RAISED BY 
COUNSEL ON APPEAL. 
In this brief, we raise and argue a number of points which 
have not been presented in appellant's briefs and were not raised 
10 
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night to arrive in Nashville on the morning of April 12, 1985, 
and took defendant's confession at approximately 3:00 P.M. that 
day in Nashville, Tennessee. If defendant had been formally 
charged with the murder, Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah v. 
United States. 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 
387 (1977); and Maine v. Moulton. 474 U.S. 159 (1985), would 
apply. At least arguably as well, the result should be the same 
if the charges were ready to be filed but were simply being held 
in abeyance for some reason. As the Court noted in Maine v. 
Moulton. the police had "an affirmative duty not to act in a 
manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection 
afforded by the right to counsel." 474 U.S. at 171. The 
Massiah. Brewer, Moulton line of cases suggest that mere 
compliance with Miranda warning requirements may not be 
sufficient to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, after 
a defendant has been formally charged with the crime he is being 
questioned ctbout. 
This brief discusses the ineffectiveness of defense counsel 
insofar as such ineffectiveness is manifest on the record. It 
must be noted however, that a more extensive showing on this 
issue would be possible by the development of non-record evidence 
in a habeas corpus proceeding. The raising of the manifest 
incompetence issue by amicus at this point ought not to preclude 
collateral proceedings if, for some reason, this Court were to 
find in favor of the State on direct appeal. 
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aggravating factor relied on was constitutionally impermissible 
... since it describes all murders and therefore fails to provide 
any guideline for channeling discretion." 
Less than a year after the Court's decision in State v. 
Wood, the Utah legislature amended the first degree murder 
provision of the Utah Code, U.C.A. 76-5-202, to add a number of 
additional statutory aggravating factors. One such aggravating 
factor# U.C.A. 76-5-202(1)(q) was carefully qualified and limited 
to avoid the constitutional infirmity found by this Court in the 
Wood case and by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Godfrey case. U.C.A. 76-5-202(1)(q) provides: 
The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of 
which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious 
physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim 
before death. 
Despite the clear qualification and limitation of the 
statute, the jury in this case was instructed on several 
occasions in the course of the trial that they should convict the 
defendant of first degree murder if they found that the homicide 
was "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally 
depraved." The special verdict form, taken by the jury into the 
jury room and used by them in reporting their verdict, used this 
same wording. In the penalty phase, they were instructed to 
weigh the aggravating factors found in the guilt phase in 
determining the penalty. The jury was never instructed in either 
the guilt phase or the penalty phase, that Utah law required that 
the heinousness, atrociousness, cruelty, or exceptional depravity 
14 
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question of the applicability of subsection (q) in this case has 
never been passed upon by anyone to date. 
It may be conceded that evidence in the case might warrant a 
jury in finding "serious bodily injury before death", but the 
point was neither argued nor addressed at trial and the jury 
never so found. Indeed, the only evidence that there was any 
appreciable time between the stab wounds and the shooting of the 
victim appears in the confession, dictated by an interrogating 
officer to a stenographer in defendants presence on the second 
day of an in custody interrogation without counsel. The 
confession was signed by defendant but can hardly be regarded as 
a completely accurate and reliable account of the details of the 
homicide, even if one accepts its "voluntariness". The State 
Medical Examiner testified that the stab wounds pierced the heart 
and would have been fatal but the victim was still alive when 
shot. (R.1281) This testimony raises a question about how much 
time could have passed between the stab wounds and the shooting. 
If there was only a brief interval, that fact would make this 
case a very doubtful one for finding aggravating circumstance 
(q) . Yet this issue was not pursued at trial, defense counsel 
asked no questions of the Medical Examiner at trial, and 
apparently, neither the jury, the judge, the prosecutor, nor the 
defense counsel considered the significance of such facts to the 
question of whether the homicide was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel. 
It certainly would not be appropriate for this Court to make 
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a factual finding that a jury would necessarily have found 
subsection (q) applied if they had been properly instructed. The 
weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors involves more than 
just finding that they are present or that they are absent. What 
is called for is a qualitative evaluation of the factors and the 
jury might well have weighed the subsection (q) factor 
differently if they had been properly instructed about what the 
legal standard was. This Court must not undertake to do the 
jury's weighing for it by speculating upon what a properly 
instructed jury would have decided. The death penalty is too 
serious and final a penalty to be imposed by speculation about 
what someone else's judgment would have been. 
The Supreme Courts of several states have reversed death 
sentences and remanded for new penalty proceedings following 
findings that one of several aggravating factors considered by a 
jury was invalid or unconstitutional; see Hopkinson v. State, 632 
P.2d 79 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Irwin. 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 
(1981); State v.Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1985). See also 
State v. Wallace. 151 Ariz.362, 728 P.2d 232, 239 (1986), in 
which the court returned a case for resentencing because one of 
two aggravating factors found by the trial judge was not 
supported by the evidence. 
There are cases from other states in which courts have 
upheld a death penalty despite a finding that the jury considered 
invalid or unconstitutional aggravating factors; Stephens v. 
State 237 Ga. 259, 227 S.E.2d 261 (1976); Ford v. State, 374 
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So.2d 496 (Fla. 1979); State v. Williams, 383 So.2d 369 (La. 
1980); Henderson v. State, 281 Ark. 406, 664 S.W.2d 451 (1984); 
Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562 (Okla. Ct. Cr. App. 1987); see 
also Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982). We urge 
that this latter group of cases are distinguishable, or wrong, or 
in some cases both wrong and distinguishable. This Court should, 
instead, follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming which concluded in Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d at 172: 
When we do not know whether the result of the weighing 
process would have been different had the impermissible 
aggravating factor not been present and when a man's life is 
at stake, we must return the case to the trial court for a 
new sentencing trial. 
The cases which reject the Hopkinson approach, do so on one 
of two theories: either a finding that consideration of the 
invalid aggravating factor was harmless error, or a conclusion 
that the appellate court itself has the power to assess the 
penalty and, making the assessment, that death is appropriate. 
Neither theory ought to apply in the present case under Utah law. 
We shall further address the harmfulness of the error, infra. As 
to the role of this Court, we urge that U.C.A. 76-3-207(4) 
provides the appropriate procedure where this Court finds 
prejudicial error; remand to the trial court for new sentencing 
proceedings. 
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of the Georgia rule, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 
862 (1983); and of the Florida rule, Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 
939 (1983); allowing affirmance of a death penalty despite the 
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invalidity of one of the aggravating circumstances considered by 
the jury. Neither of these decisions warrants this Court in 
adopting a similar rule as a matter of Utah law. 
In Zant v. Stephens, supra, the defendant was sentenced to 
death by the Georgia jury which had found two statutory 
aggravating factors. While the case was on appeal, one of the 
aggravating factors found by the jury was, in another case, held 
to be unconstitutionally vague by the Georgia Supreme Court. The 
Georgia Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the death penalty 
in the Stephens case because it found the two remaining 
aggravating circumstances adequately supported the sentence. 
This position was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court. 
Subsequently, Stephens challenged the death penalty by federal 
habeas corpus. He was successful before the Fifth Circuit but 
that court's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. In 
reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized the Georgia Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the role of the Georgia jury in a death 
penalty case. In Georgia, once a statutory aggravating factor is 
found the jury has full discretion in determining the penalty in 
light of all relevant factors and is not required to weigh the 
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in reaching its 
decision. The Supreme Court stated it was not expressing any 
opinion about cases where the jury was required by state law to 
weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in 
reaching a decision on the penalty; 462 U.S. at 890. 
Unlike the Stephens case, a Utah jury is required to do more 
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than merely find an aggravating circumstance before it may choose 
to impose the death penalty. Utah juries must also weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors and determine that the death 
penalty is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wood, supra, 648 P.2d at 71. In Cartwriaht v. Maynard, 
822 F.2d 1477, (10th Cir. 1987), the court struck down an 
Oklahoma death sentence because one of the aggravating factors 
considered by the jury in weighing the penalty was the 
unconstitutionally vague standard that the killing was 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." The court ruled that 
Zant v. Stephens didn't apply because the jury in Oklahoma weighs 
the aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the 
penalty. The court said: 
A death sentence that is imposed pursuant to a balancing 
that included consideration of an unconstitutional 
aggravating circumstance must be vacated under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. 
822 F.2d at 1483. A similar approach was taken in Collins v. 
Lgckhart, 754 F.2d 258, (8th Cir. 1985), cert. den. 474 U.S. 
1013, in which the court struck down as unconstitutional, a 
statutory aggravating circumstance which duplicated a provision 
which was part of the definition of first degree murder. The 
court then noted that there were other statutory aggravating 
factors validly found by the jury. Despite this latter fact, the 
court concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutionally 
imposed because in Arkansas the jury is charged with the 
responsibility of weighing the aggravating circumstances against 
the mitigating circumstances in determining whether or not the 
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death penalty should be imposed. 
In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, the Court reviewed a 
death sentence imposed by the trial judge who had improperly 
considered defendant's prior criminal record as an aggravating 
factor though, under Florida law, such record should not have 
been considered. Six members of the Court found no 
constitutional flaw in the decision of the Florida Supreme Court 
upholding the death penalty though the trial judge had 
incorrectly considered as aggravating, a factor that he should 
not have considered. Justice Rehnquist for four members of the 
Court emphasized that the decision of the Florida Supreme Court 
involved the application of Florida's harmless error rule and 
that the Florida decision was "butressed" by its unique 
procedural context under Florida law. The trial judge's decision 
was one overriding a jury recommendation of life imprisonment and 
such an overriding decision will only be upheld by the Florida 
Supreme Court if that court finds that "virtually no reasonable 
person could differ" 463 U.S. at 958. The opinion of Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justice Powell, also emphasized the particular 
provisions of Florida law which provided safeguards to assure 
that the death penalty was not imposed in an arbitrary or 
unprincipled way. 
In Cartwriaht v. Maynard, supra, and in Collins v. Lockhart, 
supra, the Tenth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals concluded 
that Barclay v. Florida did not apply outside the narrow confines 
of a sentencing structure and procedure like that of Florida's. 
21 
This case, unlike the Barclay case, does not involve a sentence 
imposed by a judge who has provided written findings of fact 
explaining the reasons for his or her decision. And unlike the 
Barclay case the present case involves an unconstitutionally 
vague aggravating circumstance particularly susceptible to 
misconstruction and misinterpretation by a jury in the absence of 
limiting instructions; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra; State v. Wood, 
supra. 
The Zant and Barclay cases conclude that, given the provisions 
of Georgia and Florida law there involved, Federal Constitutional 
standards were not violated in those cases. In each case the 
Court rejected the contention that the improper consideration of 
invalid aggravating factors rendered the decisions vulnerable to 
a charge that the penalty was imposed in an arbitrary or 
unprincipled way. But in the present case the vague and 
standardless language considered by the jury was invalid 
precisely because it invited the jury to consider whatever they 
interpreted the vague and standardless language to mean and then, 
following the trial judges instructions, weigh whatever the 
language meant to them in determining the appropriate penalty. 
They were not just allowed to consider whatever the vague 
language meant to them, they were expressly directed to weigh 
such and consider it, in determining the appropriate penalty. 
Indeed, they were bound to consider it, whatever it meant, in 
determining the penalty. 
The Zant and Barclay cases are both distinguishable on another 
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ground. In each case, the improper aggravating factor was 
relatively minor, when compared with other statutory aggravating 
factors in the case. In Zant, the defendant had previously been 
convicted of a capital felony, and was an escaped convict at the 
time he committed the homicide for which he was sentenced to 
death. The fact that he committed the murder while in the course 
of a burglary and robbery and had many prior burglary and robbery 
convictions was admissible for the jury to consider, even though 
not itself a statutory aggravating circumstance. The aggravating 
circumstance improper to consider was that defendant was a 
"person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive 
criminal convictions". In Barclay, the killing was of an 
eighteen year old hitchhiker who was killed because of his race 
by defendant and codefendants who sought thereby to trigger a 
race war. Aggravating factors found by the trial judge were that 
Barclay had knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons, had committed the murder while engaged in kidnapping, 
had endeavored to disrupt governmental functions and law 
enforcement and that the homicide had been especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel. The aggravating circumstance the Florida 
court invalidly considered was a previous felony conviction. 
In the present case, the aggravating circumstance about 
which the jury was erroneously instructed was one of two found by 
the jury, and must have been given considerable weight by the 
jury. 
Another major reason why neither Zant v. Stephens nor 
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Barclay v. Florida controls this case is that in those cases the 
Supreme Court, mindful of its limited role in reviewing state law 
under the Federal Constitution, essentially deferred to what it 
regarded as permissible interpretations of state law. Certainly, 
not everything the Supreme Court finds to be permissible should 
be accepted as desirable by state Supreme Courts interpreting 
their own state law and state constitutions. This Court, 
applying its responsibility to interpret State law and the State 
Constitution, should not treat the Supreme Court's restraint in 
those cases as warranting a decision to uphold a death penalty 
imposed by a Utah jury misinstructed about the applicable Utah 
statutory standard to be followed in determining whether death 
was the appropriate penalty. 
Ill 
THE INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR ON THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE, "ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, ETC.", 
WAS MAGNIFIED BY IMPROPER AND MISLEADING ARGUMENT TO 
THE JURY BY THE PROSECUTOR. 
The error in failing to instruct the jury on the limited and 
qualified meaning of the subsection (q) especially heinous, 
atrocious, etc., was aggravated by argument of the prosecutor 
emphasizing the heinous nature of the killing on grounds 
inconsistent with the statutory meaning of subsection (q) . So 
that the argument can be fairly appraised in context, we quote it 
extensively. In the guilt phase the prosecutor argued as follows: 
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Did he kill her in an exceptionally heinous, atrocious 
and cruel manner. You think about it. I know you 
will. You'll put yourself in a house and think about 
your husband's down feeding the horse. Your young son 
has gone off with some friends to go bowling or 
otherwise enjoy the evening, you are alone, there's 
ring at the doorbell, you answer it, there's a man 
standing there, it's dark, 8:00 o'clock or thereabouts, 
a February night in the winter, in Provo and the phone 
rings. You go to answer it, you come back and the man 
is no longer standing outside the door, he's inside 
your home. He has uninvitedly stepped inside the 
dwelling place. And what does he do? He brandishes a 
firearm and says I want your money, and Mrs. Oleson 
gives him the money, and she runs for her life, she 
grabs the first weapon she can lay her hands on when 
she's passing through the kitchen, and then he takes 
her, and murders her. And if you want to think 
about heinous and atrocious and cruel, you just take 
time and sit in the jury room and think about him 
pulling the trigger of that gun three times. It 
doesn't fire. He fixes that. It doesn't fire again. 
He fixes that and then he shoots her right in the head 
at point blank range. And she was still alive after he 
stabbed her. Look at the length of the blade of that 
knife. Think about the medical examiner's testimony of 
thing being in there seven-and-a-half inches deep. As 
I look at it, he's punched that knife in there clear to 
the handle. Not once but eight times. Punctured her 
lung five times punctured her heart, broke three ribs, 
fractured the ribs with the force of the blow. And she 
survives that only to be murdered with the firearm. ... 
(R.1351-1352). In the penalty phase the prosecutor similarly 
argued factors unrelated to the Utah statute's requirements as 
establishing that the homicide was especially heinous and cruel: 
You take that scale of justice and you put on this 
side, Eva Oleson, you put "atrocious" you put "cruel" 
and you put the fact that an aggravated burglary was 
committed in her own home; and then you go to this side 
and you look for mitigating circumstances, you look for 
the five that I just talked about, the youth of the 
defendant, prior criminal history, mental disease and 
defect, intoxication. You search the evidence, search 
the record, search what's been put in this trial before 
you, and you ask yourselves; can that side of the scale 
of justice what sits in this side of the scale, (sic) . 
You put the body of Eva Oleson in your mind with the 
stab marks in her back and the gunshot wound to her 
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head with such force and velocity that the gun powder 
itself blows into her brain. And you talk about 
heinous and cruel and atrocious, and you talk about the 
fact that that woman was still alive, still breathing 
and gasping for air in the most pain that anybody can 
endure in this life# you put her on that side of your 
scale of justice, ladies and gentlemen, and you ask 
yourself whether there is any mitigating circumstance 
or fact whatsoever in this world that can outweigh that 
beyond a reasonable doubt .... 
(R.1437). Parenthetically, it must be noted that there was no 
evidence at trial that the victim was gasping for breath or was 
in severe pain. Also prejudicial was the prosecutor's argument 
expressing anger that the defense attorney had dared to argue 
that the homicide might not qualify as especially heinous and 
cruel: 
His lawyer stood up here yesterday and talked about 
murder is murder is murder, and he actually tried to suggest 
to you that this is a murder, sure and its a bad thing but 
it doesn't raise itself to the level to the level of 
heinous, cruel and atrocious. That angers me, And, I submit 
to you it should anger you. 
(R.1438). What had triggered the prosecutor's "anger" was an 
argument by defense counsel at the guilt phase that dared to 
suggest that the homicide might be a murder but still might not 
qualify as especially heinous and cruel. Unless instructed to 
the contrary, reasonable people might well feel anger at a 
defense counsel who argued that an intentional murder of a 
defenseless woman during a burglary was not heinous, atrocious, 
and cruel. But the reasonableness of such feelings aggravates 
rather than excuses the error since the Utah standard means 
something different and the jury in this case was never so 
informed. The argument of the prosecutor encouraged and invited 
26 
the jury to apply precisely the kind of unlimited discretion that 
this Court held to be constitutionally impermissible in State v. 
Wood and the United States Supreme Court held to be improper in 
Godfrey v. Georgia. 
IV 
ON REMAND, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD INSTRUCT THE JURY 
THAT A HOMICIDE DOES NOT QUALIFY AS ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, 
ATROCIOUS, ETC., UNDER U.C.A. 76-5-202(1)(Q), UNLESS 
THE JURY FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT (1) INTENTIONALLY 
TORTURED THE VICTIM OR (2) INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY 
INFLICTED SERIOUS PHYSICAL ABUSE OR SERIOUS BODILY 
INJURY IN ADDITION TO AND BEFORE CAUSING THE VICTIM'S 
DEATH OR THAT THE MANNER BY WHICH THE VICTIM WAS KILLED 
CAUSED PROLONGED SUFFERING AND WAS INTENDED BY THE 
PREPETRATOR TO CAUSE OR WAS KNOWN TO BE LIKELY TO CAUSE 
PROLONGED SUFFERING BY THE VICTIM BEFORE DEATH. 
This case must be remanded for resentencing or retrial 
because of manifest errors. On remand, the trial court will be 
faced with the need to construe the meaning of U.C.A. sect.76-5-
202(1)(q). There is need for this Court to provide additional 
guidance on the meaning of the subsection. In construing the 
statute the Court should be guided by three important 
considerations: 
(1) The subsection was intended by the legislature to be 
constitutional; it was therefore intended to meet the 
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requirements of Godfrey v. Georgia and related cases; 
(2) Therefor, the aggravating factor should be construed so 
that it serves to distinguish a category of intentional or 
knowing killings which may be deserving of the law's most severe 
punishment because such killings are exceptionally culpable, even 
when compared with intentional or knowing murders in general; 
(3) Due consideration must be given to the language of the 
statute, its fair import, and the legislative choices reflected 
in the language. 
The approach suggested is essentially that followed and by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey in a recent landmark case; State v. 
Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). In that case the 
Court construed New Jersey's aggravating factor: 
the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or 
an aggravated battery to the victim. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(c). In construing the factor to avoid 
unconstitutional vagueness and achieve the intended meaning of 
the legislature, the court ruled: 
this aggravating factor exists if the murder involved 
tortures, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim. Torture or aggravated battery to the victim shall 
be found if the defendant intended to cause, and did in fact 
cause severe physical or psychological pain or suffering to 
the victim prior to the victim's death, "severity" measured 
either by the intensity of the pain, or the duration of the 
pain, or a combination of both. 
524 A.2d, at 231. Of course this Court, construing Utah's 
Statute must recognize the differences as well as the 
similarities when comparing our statute with those of other 
states. For example, Utah requires physical torture so 
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psychological pain or suffering would not suffice. Accordingly, 
Amicus urges that the jury should be instructed that subsection 
(q) applies where the killer intentionally tortured the victim 
physically, or intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious 
physical abuse or serious bodily injury in addition to and before 
causing the victim's death wounds or injuries which caused death, 
or where the manner of killing was one which caused prolonged 
suffering and was intended by the perpetrator to cause or was 
known to be likely to cause prolonged suffering by the victim 
before death. It should not qualify for subsection (q) that the 
victim received one or more fatal wounds but did not die 
immediately. The jury should be further instructed that the mere 
fact that defendant inflicted several wounds with intent to kill 
her would not be enough in itself, to show that the killing was 
especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, etc., even if the first 
wounds inflicted did not immediately cause death. 
The standard set forth above reflects the language of the 
Utah statute which requires that the homicide be especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved; and also 
provides that any of the foregoing must be shown by physical 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death. The Utah provision is more limited than 
that of some other states with comparable language. State v. 
Ramseur. supra. Compare: State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 728 
P.2d 232, 237 (1986); State v. Palmer, 224 Neb. 282, 399 N.W.2d 
706, 728-32 (1986); State v. Osborn. 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187, 
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212-214 (1981); State v. Cooper, 718 S.W.2d 256 (Tenn. 1986); 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554 (1984); State 
v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. 1984). Jackson v. State, 451 
So. 458 (Fla. 1984). Thus, a homicide proceeded by physical 
torture would clearly fit subsection (q) , but a homicide would 
not qualify under the Utah provision merely because the defendant 
desecrated the body after the killing or killed without any 
reason for doing so. While such a homicide might be said to be 
especially heinous, atrocious, etc., it would not meet the 
statute's requirement that such be shown by "physical torture, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim 
before death". The Florida Supreme Court, interpreting Florida's 
comparable aggravating circumstance, has said that "actions after 
the death of the victim are irrelevant in determining this 
aggravating circumstance." Jackson v. State, supra, 451 So. 2d 
at 463. Compare State v. Williams, supra at 690 S.W.2d 528-530. 
The Florida Supreme Court also ruled in Jackson that Florida's 
aggravating circumstance requires evidence that the victim 
remained conscious at the time multiple injuries were inflicted. 
In requiring physical torture as one of the subsection (q) 
alternatives, Utah's provision resembles that of Oregon which 
makes it an aggravating factor that the murder was committed "in 
the course of or as a result of intentional ... torture of the 
victim", ORS 163.095(1)(e); construed in State v. Cornell. 304 
Ore. 27, 741 P.2d 501 (1987), to require that the perpetrator 
have the intent to inflict intense pain as one reason for his 
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intentional act; 741 P. 2d, at 504. The Supreme Court of 
California has reached a similar conclusion in interpreting the 
California statute; People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 710 P.2d 
861, 875 (1985): 
The very use of the term torture to describe the class 
of murders to which the subdivision applies necessarily 
imports into the statute a requirement that the 
perpetrator have the sadistic intent to cause the 
victim to suffer pain in addition to the pain of death, 
which intent is distinct from the intent to cause the 
victim's death. 
While Utah's subsection (q), differs from California law and 
Oregon law in that torture is only one of three alternative ways 
that the homicide may be shown to qualify as especially heinous, 
atrocious, etc., the other alternatives must be construed in a 
way which makes sense of the entire subsection. If any serious 
bodily injury inflicted before death qualified to make subsection 
(q) applicable, then all murders caused by seriously injuring the 
victim who nevertheless survived for some measurable time, 
however brief, would qualify and there would be no case where the 
other two alternatives in subsection (q) would ever need to be 
considered. More importantly, the problem posed by the Godfrey 
and Wood cases would still exist under subsection (q) . The 
statute's language would describe almost all intentional murders 
and therefore fail to provide any guideline for channeling 
discretion; State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 86. For these reasons, 
the Court should construe the statute to apply only to homicides 
in which there is an intentional or knowing infliction of pain, 
serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury for its own sake 
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or as something apart and additional to the homicidal acts. 
V 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BECAUSE OF COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE MOTIONS 
FOR DISCOVERY AND COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE 
OF THE PROSECUTOR'S OPEN FILE POLICY, AS WELL AS THE 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FULLY INVESTIGATE THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION, RELEVANT 
POSSIBLE MITIGATING EVIDENCE, AND APPLICABLE UTAH CASE 
LAW AND STATUTES WHICH HAD AN OBVIOUS BEARING ON THE 
DEFENSE OF THIS CASE. 
In Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983), this 
Court stated the standard applicable to determining a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel: "The Sixth Amendment demands 
that defense counsel exercise the skill, judgment, and diligence 
of a reasonably competent defense attorney." The Court then 
identified considerations necessary to a determination of whether 
to reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel: 
(1) The burden is on the defendant and proof of such must 
be demonstrable and not a speculative matter .... 
(2) A lawyer's legitimate ... choice of trial strategy or 
tactics that did not produce the anticipated result does not 
constitute ineffective assistance .... 
(3) It must appear that any deficiency in performance of 
counsel was prejudicial. 
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Subsequently, in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986), 
the Court reiterated these considerations, but explained that the 
showing of prejudice only required defendant to establish a 
"reasonable probability ... that but for counsel's error the 
result would have been different." The Court further defined 
"reasonable probability" as that "sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict." 723 P.2d at 405, 
citing State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984), and 
Strickland v.Washington, 466 U.S. 674 (1984). 
This Court's standard is consistent with that announced by the 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ; 
and reiterated in Kimmelman v. Washington, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 
2574 (1986), requiring defendant to show "both that counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." 106 S.Ct. at 2583. 
Because defense counsel in this case failed to exercise the 
diligence of a reasonably competent counsel, and because the 
defendant was clearly prejudiced thereby in the penalty phase of 
the trial, this case must be remanded for a new penalty hearing. 
First, it seems clear that counsel was not aware of the 
meaning or language of U.C.A. sect. 76-5-202(1)(q), since he 
neither objected to the court's erroneous instructions nor argued 
the failure of the evidence to meet subsection (q)'s requirements 
in support of his contention in closing argument at the guilt 
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phase that although the homicide might have been murder it 
nevertheless was not so heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Yet, for 
an attorney to go to a state where he was not a member of the bar 
to defend a capital case and then fail to familiarize himself 
with that state's statute defining first degree murder and 
defining the aggravating circumstances relevant to imposition of 
the death penalty is clearly a failure to perform as a competent 
professional. Similarly, the failure to make a motion for 
discovery under Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for 
all written or recorded statements made by the defendant and for 
the autopsy report was clearly incompetent. But counsel made no 
such motion. (R. 1302-3). Had the defense counsel obtained the 
confession and the autopsy report in advance of trial he would 
have recognized that the autopsy report indicated a stab wound 
through the heart as well as several stab wounds which punctured 
the lungs. Yet the confession says that after stabbing the 
victim defendant went around the house searching for things to 
steal before returning to the victim and shooting her. If 
counsel had obtained the confession and the autopsy report in 
advance, as a competent attorney, he would have recognized that 
there were substantial questions whether the victim was conscious 
after the stab wounds were inflicted and whether the victim could 
have survived the stab wounds for more than a brief interval. 
But the defense attorney never raised these questions, did not 
even ask the medical examiner a single question in cross 
examination, and did not object to the prosecutor's statement in 
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final argument in the penalty phase that the victim suffered "the 
most pain that anybody could ever endure in this life ", 
(R.1437); though there was no evidence in the record to support 
that assertion by the prosecutor. 
Since counsel's strategy in the case was to call no 
witnesses in the guilt phase, it would seem that minimally 
competent performance required him to familiarize himself with 
what Utah law required the prosecution to prove and to find out 
before trial what evidence the prosecutor intended to present. 
Under these circumstances, failure to make a motion for discovery 
was a failure to perform competently; but defense counsel 
compounded that failure by failing even to take advantage of the 
prosecutor's offer to allow defense counsel to examine the 
prosecution file. (R.1304) Counsel's unfamiliarity with Utah 
law was graphically illustrated by defense counsel's argument in 
arrest of judgment just before the court imposed the death 
sentence. Counsel urged the court to set aside the judgment 
arguing: 
"it was my understanding that the standard, based on the 
evidence presented, the standard should have been that the 
reasonable mind or reasonable minds as such, hearing the 
evidence could not extract more aggravating circumstances 
than mitigating circumstances." 
(R.424). While this mis-statement was not prejudicial since the 
court when denying the motion made clear that the appropriate 
standard required a finding beyond a reasonable doubt, defense 
counsel's unawareness of the correct standard demonstrated his 
complete unfamiliarity with the applicable Utah law. 
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Other aspects of defense counsel's performance, perhaps 
explainable as failed trial strategy, add perspective to 
counsel's failures to discover or prepare adequately on Utah law. 
Counsel made a motion for change of venue but offered neither 
opinion survey evidence nor witnesses to support his claim of 
local prejudice, though he did call witnesses to testify to 
extensive pretrial publicity. Defendant called no witnesses at 
trial; the only evidence offered by defense at the penalty phase 
was the reading of the reports of two "alienists", a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist, who had been appointed by the court before 
trial to examine defendant and report to the court following a 
notice from defense counsel of intention to rely on the defense 
of insanity. No family members were called; no other evidence 
was offered in mitigation. 
At the hearing to suppress the confession, defense counsel 
elicited no evidence relevant to whether defendant was afforded 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United 
States. 377 U.S. 201 (1964),and Brewer v. Williams. 430 U.S. 387 
(1977). Perhaps the failure to pursue the motion for change of 
venue by offering more evidence in support of it reflects trial 
strategy or the unavailability of evidence. Perhaps the failure 
to call witnesses in the penalty phase is similarly explainable. 
But failure to take advantage of available discovery procedures, 
failure to take advantage of the prosecutor's open file offer, 
failure to familiarize himself with the relevant statutory 
standard and compare the language of the statute with the 
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language of the information and the instructions to the jury 
hardly qualifies as competent representation of a client whose 
life was at stake. These errors were far from harmless. 
It cannot be said that the failure of representation had no 
effect on the result of the trial. Defendant had a real defense; 
that this homicide, though murder was not especially heinous, 
atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved under the applicable 
Utah standard because it was not shown to have involved physical 
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the 
victim before death, as Utah law requires. The issue was never 
raised and the evidence on the question was never pursued, 
presented, or determined at trial. Arguments by the prosecutor 
to the jury which were clearly inconsistent with the language of 
subsection (q) were allowed to go without challenge and without 
objection. This Court, like the judge and jury below, can only 
speculate on the question of whether the victim suffered for a 
substantial period after being stabbed, can only speculate 
whether she suffered intense pain, as the prosecutor argued, can 
only speculate whether she was conscious after being stabbed, can 
only speculate whether the defendant did indeed, wander about the 
house, for a minute, or three minutes, or four minutes, as the 
statement dictated by Lt. Pierpont and signed by the defendant 
might suggest. 
In State v. Woods, this Court reiterated that in reviewing 
a capital case, the Court would determine whether the sentence of 
death "was disproportionate"; 648 P.2d at 77, citing State v. 
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Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977). How can the Court begin to 
make such assessment in this case? Failure of defense counsel to 
develop evidence relevant to the determination of guilt and 
penalty under Utah law; failure of defense counsel to present at 
trial matters relevant to this Court1s assessment of the 
proportional appropriateness of the death penalty in this case 
require that the case be remanded for a new penalty hearing. 
VI 
THOUGH OTHER ERRORS REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY AND REMAND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, THE COURT 
SHOULD TAKE THE OCCASION OF THIS CASE TO PROVIDE 
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BE GIVEN IN THE PENALTY 
PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE TRIED TO A JURY. 
This Court should mandate additional instructions to the 
jury in a capital case to assure that jury deliberations do not 
proceed on the assumption that death is a more appropriate 
penalty in a capital case than life imprisonment. The Court's 
decision in State v. Wood, supra, though providing important 
protections for the defendant in a capital case needs further 
elaboration and explanation in the form of a mandatory 
instruction to the jury. In State v. Shaffer. Utah, 725 P.2d 1301 
(1986), this Court noted the findings in a study by Professor 
Craig Haney that the process of "death qualifying" a jury tended 
itself to have an impact on the jury and among other effects, to 
make them more likely to assume that the law disapproves of 
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persons who oppose the death penalty and more likely to believe 
that the defendant deserves the death penalty. 725 P.2d at 1311; 
referring C. Haney; Juries and the Death Penalty; Readdressing 
the Witherspoon Question, 26 Crime and Delinq. 512, 523 (1980). 
Responding to the indications of the Haney study, this Court 
approved an approach whereby voir dire would be conducted 
individually with the jurors sequestered to minimize side effects 
of death qualification. 
We urge an additional protection: that the jurors be 
instructed at the commencement of the trial that the fact that 
the case is potentially a capital case should in no way be 
regarded as suggesting the appropriateness of that penalty. 
During the penalty phase that instruction should be repeated and 
the jury should also be told that the law regards a sentence of 
life imprisonment as no less appropriate in capital cases than 
the penalty of death; that the choice of penalty should be 
determined after consideration of all the evidence but that death 
should be regarded as an exceptional penalty to be imposed only 
if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence in 
aggravation outweighs the evidence in mitigation and also finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that death is more appropriate than 
life imprisonment as the penalty in the case. 
Such an instruction would serve to mitigate the fact that 
the jury will sentence the defendant with only the case specific 
facts before them and without information which would allow them 
to appraise the case in comparison with and in proportion to 
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other first degree murder cases. Lacking such basis for 
comparison, a jury is likely to conclude that the death penalty 
is the usual penalty rather than the exception or that they are 
abusing discretion if they allow an inclination to mercy to 
affect the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating 
factors. Such an instruction would also serve to offset the fact 
that the jury uniquely, in the whole spectrum of criminal justice 
sentencing in Utah, is the only sentencer without previous 
experience in sentencing, without exposure to and prior 
consideration of the purposes of punishment. Any sentencing 
judge will have thought about the policies of sentencing and 
corrections and will bring prior thought and prior experience in 
the system to the difficult task of sentencing in a capital case. 
But when a jury sentences in a capital case, it is only 
instructed on the case specific facts and is given no basis for 
making judgments of proportional appropriateness. Of course, 
once the jury decides in favor of death, a presumption of 
correctness precludes completely de novo reconsideration of the 
appropriateness of their decision. But, since they have only the 
case specific facts before them, the jury's decision is likely to 
be skewed in favor of a death sentence. 
An instruction making clear that life imprisonment is a fully 
appropriate penalty in a "capital case" would partially alleviate 
the risk that the very description of the case or the process of 
death qualification conveyed a notion that the law had a 
preferred penalty. An instruction that the death penalty is an 
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exceptional penalty for exceptional cases would simply convey 
information to the jury that everybody else in the system of 
criminal justice knows. 
VII 
ALTHOUGH THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE AN 
ADEQUATE BASIS FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW, IT APPEARS 
THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE DOES NOT DESERVE DEATH 
WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER UTAH MURDER CASES. 
There are significant gaps in the record as a result of the 
failure of the proceedings below to focus upon the factors 
relevant to a determination that the killing was especially 
heinous, atrocious, cruel, etc., under Utah law. Thus, relevant 
considerations about the suffering of the victim can only be the 
subject of speculation. So too, relevant data about the 
defendant does not appear in the record because of defense 
counsel's failure to offer such evidence in the penalty phase. 
Nevertheless, some facts relevant to a judgment about the 
proportional appropriateness of the death penalty may be 
asserted. Defendant killed one victim in what appears to be a 
sudden outburst of unplanned violence. There is no indication of 
a prior history of violent acts. He has two prior burglary 
convictions before coming to Utah, but these were apparently not 
violent or aggravated burglaries. 
Murder is a terrible crime. But neither the crime nor the 
criminal in this case are distinguishable from many cases in 
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which the death penalty is not imposed. The penalty imposed in 
this case seems disproportionately severe. 
CONCLUSION 
The penalty of death was imposed on defendant in a trial 
where basic rights under Utah law were violated. The jury 
received no guidance on the elements of a homicide committed in 
an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The statutory 
limitation, designed to provide a constitutional check on 
untrammeled jury discretion, was ignored by court and counsel. 
The prosecutor aggravated the error by improper argument and the 
defense counsel failed to exercise reasonable diligence and 
professional competence, all to defendant's grave prejudice. For 
these reasons, the case must be remanded for a new penalty 
hearing. 
This Court should provide additional guidance for such 
hearing, on the meaning of the statutory aggravating factor and 
should mandate additional instructions to minimize the risk of 
misguided imposition of the death penalty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
By. i^v^kZ H *HA-^^^JLPJX 
LIONEL H. FRANKEL 
Counsel for 
The American Civil Liberties Union 
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